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LOWELL VS. CARUANA AND 
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY IN MAL TA 
JOHN M. VASSALLO 
'11-poteri tal-esekuciv gnandhom jigu eserC:itati legalment, u kull 
poter Ii johrog minn statut ghandu jigi e:ZerC:.ltat mill-awtorita 
preskritta fl-istatut u skond il-kliem u 1-intenzjoni tal-legisla-
tur'. (per Caruana Curran }.,.Lowell vs. Caruana). 1 
' ... f'din il·materja, m'ghandux ikun hemm rigori2:mu statiku jew 
delimitazzjoni indebita tal-•judicial control'". (perHardingJ., 
Pdice vs. Gerald Caruana). 2 
The judgement of the Civil Court Ost Hall) in Lowell vs. Car-
uana, delivered on 14th August, 1972, 3 per the Hon. Mr. Justice 
Caruana Curran, has cleared the ground for an appreciation of 
judicial trends in the application, culminating in rejection, of the 
notion of ius imperii where governmental liability is at issue.4 The 
judgement, basing itself upon a logic which repays careful exam· 
ination for the kind of judicial approach which it articulates, in-
sists that the doctrine of sovereign immunity for the Administra-
tion when it acts iure imperii cannot be considered as forming any 
longer a part of Maltese Law. The doctrine, at least in its more 
sweeping applications, has been stultifying the better part of gov-
ernmental liability, namely that of keeping the Administration with-
in the law, wherever and howsoever necessary. Partly as an effect 
and partly as a cause thereof, judicial control of administrative 
action in Malta has been inhibited from growing into a body of pub-
lic law with direct usefulness for the law of governmental liability. 
It is my intention in the present article to discuss these and other 
kindred implications as they arise from this judgement. 
1 l4th August, 1972. 
2 9th September, 1953. 
3 An Appeal was lodged in 1976 but has not been yet decided. 
4 Yide Gulia: Governmental Liability in Malta. It must be noted that Lowell 
vs. Caruana has, to a great extent, superimposed itself upon Dr. Gulia' s 
entirely original legal scholarship in this field. 
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The Planning Area Permits Board (P .A.P .B.) had issued, to 
plaintiffs in this case, a permit which should have remained valid 
'for one calendar year from date of issue', according to the ex-
press terms of the grant of such permit. However, the P .A.P .B. 
purported to withdraw and to consider as 'cancelled' this permit 
before its year of validity was out. Plaintiffs sought to impugn the 
lawfulness of the Board's cancellation of the permit, for the pur-
pose of recovering damages they had suffered as a result thereof. 
Defendants, claiming that the Board could lawfully do what it had 
done, submitted (that) ' ... Ii, fi kwalunkwe kaz, huma agixxew 
iure imperii u ghalhekk m 'humiex passibbli tad-danni'. 5 
It is useful to query, even though at this stage: how did the 
Court react to the issue of governmental liability, confronted as it 
was by an allegation on the one hand of excess of jurisdiction by 
an administrative body, and on the other hand by defendants' re-
buttal that Government had acted iure imperii? Apparently uncon-
cerned with the plea of iure imperii the Court defined the issue, 
calling for decision, in the following unambiguous terms: 
' .•. jekk cioe il-P .A.P .B . . .. jistax jirtira permess minnu for-
malment mahrug, qabel ma skada 2:-zmien tal-validica ta' dak 
il-permess, bla ma jirrendi rum obbligat li jikkompensa lill-
persuna li tkun akkwistat dak il-penness tad-danni li tkun sofriet 
b'dak 1-agir tal-Board .. .'6 
The point whether a liability to pay damages would arise, remained 
to be determined by the criterion of the lawfulness or otherwise of 
the administrative act causing such damages: 
' .•• m'ghandux ikun hemm dubju li jekk 1-agir (tal-Board) tal-kon-
venuti fir-revoka tal-permess johrog barra mill-limiti tal-ligi, clan 
1-att jista' jaghti lok ghal-likwidazzjoni ta' kumpens in linea ta' 
danni .. .'7 
The plea of iure imperii has so far been so clearly precluded from 
the Court's concern with the point of governmental liability, that 
one must think the Court considered the plea to be irrelevant to 
that point. In effect, the plea was examined only after the Court 
had actually established an excess of jurisdiction by the P .A.P .B., 
so that plaintiffs as from that moment would have been entitled, if 
damages should be proved, 'ghall-hlas tad-danni derivanti mill-
ill eCi tu'. More specifically, it emerges that the Court has refused 
to allow the point of excess of jurisdiction to be bypassed with 
5 Lowell vs. Caruana. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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the plea that 'fi kwalunkwe kaz• Government had acted iure im-
perii. 
The Court's review of the Board's exercise of its powers in is· 
suing permits took the form of a thoroughgoing interpretation of the 
ad hoc legislation which specifically delimited the extent of those 
powers. The interpretation to be placed by the Court upon the rele· 
vant legal provisions would determine whether the impugned act 
was ultra vires the Board's powers: 
'To a large extent judicial review of administrative action is a 
specialised branch of statutory interpretation'. 8 
Did the legislation expressly grant the power to withdraw and can-
cel a permit, already formally issued, while that permit was still 
operative according to the terms of its making? The acnial wording 
of the law specified that a permit could either be granted or else 
be refused. Therefore: 
'Merud rigward ghall·importanza tal-materj a, c ioe il-kummerc 
edilizju, u il-pjanifikazzjoni ta' 1-izvilupp, ,jl-Qorti gllandha tif. 
hem illi kieku il-legislatur kellu l·intenzjoni li jagtti ... poter 
daqshekk drastiku, ma kienx sejjer jonqos li jesprimi dik 1-inten-
zjoni bi kliem adegwati fl-istatut principali stess (ubi lex voluit 
dixit) ••• ' 9 
If the Board had wanted to reserve the power to withdraw the per-
mit it could and should have done this by making it a condition at 
the same time the permit itself was being issued. 
The Court's construction of the law has not been merely verbal, 
but also functional, in the sense that a certain class of considera-
tions ('il-kummerc edilizju u 1-pjanifikazjoni tal~izVilupp') have in-
fluenced the extent of the appropriate control which the Court 
deemed it should exercise. If, as Griffith and Street opine, 'no 
functional consideration of administrative action can ignore statu-
tory interpretation', 10 then statutory interpretation must at times be 
functional, where legislation conferring powers on the Administra-
tion is concerned. It was through a functional interpretation that, in 
Lowell vs. Caruana, the Court argued most trenchantly for estab-
lishing governmental liability. The Court seemed to be asking: 
What was the nature of plaintiffs' relationship with the P .A.P .B. 
as soon as they were granted their permit? Was the P .A.P .B.'s al-
leged power to cancel a permit, as they did here, to be considered 
as within the lawful scope of their relationship with plaintiffs; or 
8'De Smith: Constitutional and Administrative Law, page 545. 
9 Lowell vs. Caruana. 
10 Griffith and Street: Administrative Law, page 145. 
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instead was it to be considered as running counter in effect to that 
relationship? The following answer is certainly trenchant: 
'Koncepibilment - u jinghad biss koncepibilment ghax il-Qorti 
issibha diffiC:li tifhem kif xi hadd jista' jaccetta li jidhol ghan-
.negozju tal-bini b'rabta hekk vaga u dissolubili - il-Board seta' 
kieku ried, impona il-kondizzjoni li 1-periness ikun ritirabili anke 
waqt i s-sena, imma dan mghamlux, u ghalhekk ma setghax 
jaghmlu wara li lahaq irrilax:Xja 1-permess. Almenu hekk tifhem 
il-Qorti glial dak li jirrigwarda 1-applikazzjoni serja tal-ligi kif 
tirrimlta mill-kliem stess tagt'fia, u tar-rule of law, kif ukoll 
1-istabilita ta' 1-operazzjonijiet kummercjali u t ar-rapporti bejn 
it-cittadini u 1-Gvem .. .' •11 
The reference, in the above passage, to the Rule of Law is fun-
damental within the context. The Rule of Law postulates Respon-
sible Administration, in terms of which concept the Administration 
'can only do that which it has power to do'. 12 Whether the Admin-
istration has power, in law, ·to do that which it has done is to be 
detei:mined by the Courts. Therefore, the subjection of executive 
discretion to increasingly higher standards of judicial control will 
have the effect of widening the orbit of governmental responsibil-
ity, as I have intended Lowell vs. Caruana to show. The signifi-
cance of this for the law of governmental liability in Malta may be 
precisely estimated if we hark back to the Court of Appeal's deci-
sion in Cassar Desain vs. Forbes (XXIX.1.43, 1935). Now in that 
decision it was underlined that, whatever the extent of immunity 
for the Administration in respect of Acts of State, the principle of 
accountability for any illegal act of the Administration would re-
main unchanged: 
' .•. if in the final judgement for some reason or other it is held 
that there has been a contravention of the law, it cannot be con-
sidered as coming under and within the limits of the sovereign 
authority.' 
And in Lowell vs. Caruana this point was as clearly underlined 
when the Court, for a better understanding of its approach, cited 
thus from Lord MacDennott's Hamlyn Lecture 'Protection from 
Power under English Law': 
'As · respects that which is truly administrative, the Executive 
is generally immune from the Courts, provided that what has 
been done has been duly authorised by law .•. ' 
Lowell vs. Caruana has gone well beyond . Cassar Desain vs. 
11 Lowell vs. CaNana. 
12 Griffich and Street: ibid. page 21. 
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Forbes in so far as it has incorporated, in the principle of ac-
countability, the public law doctrine of excess of jurisdiction. 
This notwithstanding, the two abovementioned decisions merge 
in their approach to the issue of Governmental liability. Out of 
more than half a century's Maltese decided cases purporting to 
deal with govemmencal liability, only Cassar Desain vs. Forbes 
and Lowell vs. Caruana13 appear to have loudly invoked the rule of 
Government's legal accountability in order to force the administra-
tion to pay damages to John Citizen. The hydra-headed doctrine of 
immuniry for those govemrpental acts which a re iure imperii, in 
those cases where the doctrine has been espoused as an a priori 
answer to the problem of ultra vires, has blocked the way to an in-
vestigation of excess of jurisdiction; or worse still, the Courts 
have failed 'to distinguish between acts iure imperii and the exec-
ution of acts in terms of executive discretion in terms of law'. 14 In 
Lowell vs. Caruana, defendants' plea 'li huma agixxew, fi kwalun-
kwe kaz, iure imperii' itself typifies this failure to distinguish 
between the ius imperii and executive discretion in terms of law, 
although the Court rebutted: '11-veru terren tal-kwistjoni ... m'hu-
wiex dak tal-iure imperii imma dak tal-possess o meno da partl 
tal-konvenuti ta' executive discretion biex jimxu kif fil"'fatt imxew 
vis-a-vis is-socj eta attrii:i'. 
When the Court actually examined the plea of iure imperii it un-
earthed, at long length for our jurisprudence, not merely the out-
datedness of the doctrine {'it-teorija antikwata tal-iure imperii '), 
but also the rationale that had induced jurists and the highest 
Courts on the Continent to discard the doctrine even while we in 
Malta were eagerly imbibing it: 
• ... ghaliex kienet qieghda timminaccja Ii tirrendi 1-lstat immuni 
ghall-gustizzja u ghar-reklami 1-aktar ekwi u fondati taC-citta-
dini danneggjati ... '. 15 
Mr. Justice Caruana Curran's direct method of attacking the doc-
trine raises a significant contrast between Lowell vs. Caruana and 
13 Sed vide Xuereb vs. Micallef per A.Magri J., 3.10.53, in which case the 
above quoted proposition from Cassar Desain was unreservedly approved 
by the Court. Having premised that proposition Magri J. proceeded to 
state: 'llli jekk il-konvenuti, in rapprezentanza tal-Gvem ••• hargux mil-
limiti gusti tad-drittijiet taghhom, kisrux il-Ligi .•. huma hwejjeg Ii jigu 
ezaminati fil-mertu tal-kawZaj u ghalhekk il-konvenuti ma jistghux a priori, 
u b'mod pregudizjali, jippretendu Ii 1-Gvem mhuwiex responsabbli tal-
hsara reklamata mill-attur'. 
14 Vide Gulia: Governmental Liability, page 14, and the decisions therein 
referred to. 
15 Lowell vs. Caruana. 
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Cassar Desdain vs. Forbes. In the latter decision, the Court of 
Appeal, wholeheartedly citing and approving Dicey's strictures 
upon French Droit Administratif, stated in 1935 that the notion of 
acts iure imperii 'forms the basis of what is known as Droit Ad-
ministratif in France and Diritto Amministrativo in Italy ... '. Such 
a misconception of what was actually happening on the Continent, 
and indeed the Judges' Diceyan bias against the French and Ital-
ian Public Law systems as a whole, clearly disabled the Court 
from directly attacking the doctrine. Accordingly, so far as Cassar 
Desain vs. Forbes could go, we had only reached the proposition 
that the doctrine was alien to Maltese Public Law, because it was 
non-British and we followed British Public Law principles where 
our own Law had a lacuna. 16 
Now this argument, basing itself exclusively on British Public 
Law principles, can be shown not to have been conclusive of the 
matter. In relation to the conflicts that have arisen in Malta be-
tween British Public Law principles and the evolution of new 
theories that have no place in British Public Law, it has been 
argued: 
'This theory of governmental responsibility is admittedly non-
British in origin, but there is no reason to consid~r the position 
anomalous, for the Maltese Courts are perfectly free in develop-
ing those theories which they feel are most suitable for the 
proper administration of justice ... '. 17 
After Lowell vs. Caruana, it has instead become possible to argue 
that the anomaly of retaining the doctrine as a part of Maltese law 
arises, not necessarily because it is non-British, but certainly 
because enlightened judicial opinion feels that it is no longer 
suitable in the least for the proper administration of justice. The 
Court's argumentation itself corroborates this point: after restating 
in broad terms 'li d-dritt pubbliku amministrativ ta' Malta huwa 
ormai sostanzjalment adottat mil-ligi Nglii:a', nevertheless the 
Court immediately followed this restatement with: 'imma jekk 
wiehed ikompli jei:amina dak li gara per ezempju fi Franza, dwar 
1-atti tal-poter pubbliku klassifikati . . . bbala actes de gouveme· 
ment insibu li 1-ezenzjoni tal-lstat mil"responsabilitti ghad-danni 
illum tinsab ristretta ghal dawk 1-atti li kif jgrud 1-istess Street 
(Governmental Liability, page 16) 'may loosely be compared with 
Acts of State in English Law"'. It was only through such direct 
pathfinding in Continental legal experience that it could be re-
16 Vide Gulia: ibid. page 11. 
17 J.M. Ganado: 'British Public Law and the Civil Law in Malta', Current 
Legal Problems, 1950. 
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cognised, at long length, that while the distinction itself between 
actes de gestion and actes de gouvemement had been renounced 
by those systems which after all had been its progenitors, 'to hold 
otherwise would make the Administration virtually free from any 
control'. 18 
Now as part and parcel of the j udgement the Court propagated 
the following argument: ' ... anki kieku qatt it-teorija tal-ius im-
perii jew actes d'autorite kellha tigi kkunsidraia bhala kuncett li 
b'xi mod ghadu jifforma parci mil-Ligi ta' Malta .•• ', then in that 
case a Court of Law would be bound logically to follow French 
practice as our most recent and enlightened guide in this field of 
law, rather than to hark back to the values inhering in the laws and 
the jurisprudence of half a century ago. Following French Law 
would inevitably mean that the Courts could extend sovereign im-
munity only, and restrictively, to such acts iure imperii as could 
be characterised as falling within the ambit of the only three clas-
ses of actes de gouvemement recognised by contemporary French 
practice. These three classes of acts clearly precluded a case of 
an act in terms of executive discretion in terms of law, such as 
had been impugned in Lowell vs. Caruana. 
The fact that the abovementioned argument should have been in-
corporated in the judgement denotes, possibly, that our Courts 
might stop fighting shy of highly developed non-British systems of 
Public Law, and that they might usefully start considering what 
Maltese Public Law could appropriately assimilate from such sys-
tems, despite the fact that they are non-British systems.19 The 
argument, above, referred to having ourselves guided by contem-
porary French practice in the application of the notion of actes de 
gouvemement. Analogously it has been indicated for example that 
'the Continental interpretation of excess of power which is rel-
atively so limited in English Public Law, is much wider and would 
open out many doors which are now locked and fully bolted'. 20 
Admittedly, in Lowell vs. Caruana itself it has been stated 'li 
d-dritt amministr.ativ Malci, kif aggomat fl-ahjar gurisprudenza re-
centi, huwa d-dritt amministrativ Ingliz ... '. But the qualification 
'kif aggomat fl-ahjar gurisprudenza recenti' really should mean, I 
submit, that Maltese Administrative Law is (or more precisely has 
remained) substantially English Administrative Law because, for 
one reason, the trend of our more recent decided cases seems to re-
fuse to look beyond British Public Law and into possibly more use-
18 Lowell vs. Caruana. 
19 Vi de Gu1 ia: Governmental Liability, page 17. 
20 Vide Gulia: ibid. 
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ful Continental legal developments. That British Public Law is the 
law of Malta where the latter has a lacuna, 21 should not also mean 
that we must perennially continue to be limited by British Public Law 
principles; if it does mean that, then it calls for revision as a rule 
of customary law and interpretation. There is no reason to prohibit 
the Courts from developing Maltese Public Law in this direction, 
if only, because it suited better the proper administration of jus-
tice, but al so because we have no doctrine of judicial precedent in 
Malta, as is notoriously known in this field especially of govern-
mental liability. 22 
In this connection, it would be revealing to recall, in the case 
Police vs. Gerald Caruana decided per Harding J. in 1953, that the 
Court did not fight shy of adducing the French principle of de-
tournement de pouvoir, when it was considering the possible 
grounds for exercising judicial control; 
'B'hekk ii-Council ma ecceda bl-ebda mod il-poteri tieghu, mal-
izzjoiament jew bi iball, b'mod li seta' jigi kreat dak Ii 1-g,1-
risti franci'Zi isej liJ detoumement de pouvoir •.• '. 
In the same judgement, significantly, while exploring the limita-
tions, developed 'fil-gurisprudenza lokali', upon judicial control, 
the Court made the following reservation: ' ... salvi zviluppi ohra 
taghha 'l quddiem, ghaliex C:ertament il-~risprudenza m 'ghandiex 
tkun statika'. Clearly, , the description 'statika' is a warning 
l!gainst 'rigorizmu statiku jew delimitazzjoni indebita tal-judicial 
control .. .'. It required a sufficiently comprehensive judicial 
awareness of the best contemporary legal development to be able, 
like Mr. Justice Harding in 1953, to adduce pertinently a French 
Public Law concept which is less constricted than the traditional 
English principle of abuse of discretion. Yet as far as a compari-
son between the French and the English principles is concerned, 
De Smith has indicated that the outstanding House of Lords' deci-
sion in Padfield vs. Minister of Agriculture (1968) subjected a 
wide executive discretion to such judicial standards that 'the case 
shows unambiguously that English Administrative Law does recog-
nise the principle that the French call detoumement de pouvoir, or 
abuse of administrative power •. .'. 23 Significantly enough, Pad-
field vs. Minister of Agriculture is characterised by De Smith as 
' the most outstanding recent example of judicial activism in 
this field of the law .. .'. 24 One wonders, respectfully, that it 
21 Cassar Desain vs. Forbes .. 
22 Vide Gulia: Governmental Liability, page 1. 
23 S.A. de Smith: Constitutional and Administrative Law, page 572. 
at Ibid. 23, page 572. 
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should require judicial act1v1sm to recognise a perfectly salutary 
principle of legal control. 
It can be shown that if in Lowell vs. Caruana a Continental 
legal tteaonent, so to speak, of the question had prevailed, 'il·veru 
terren tal-kwistjoni' would still have remained 'il·pussess o · 
meno ... ta' executive discretion', and certainly not the docttine 
of iure imperii; that is, if one did not assume that Lowell vs. 
Caruaria had necessarily and inevitably to be decided on the basis 
of British Public Law exclusively. This can be shown by referring 
to a case decided by the Italian Corte di Cassazipne in 1903, De 
Nittis - Comune di Foggia (we must be grateful to Dr. Gulia for 
incorporating this judgement in his 'Governmental Liability'). The 
following excerpt from the judgement in question should make the 
point on its own: 
• ••. per stabilire la insindacabilio\ dell' atto amministrativo sia 
mestieri esaminare se l'autorita da cui emana avesse podesca 
discrezionale all 'uopo e se ne abbia usato dentto i limiti in cui 
le e legalmente attribuito. Qualora manchi la podesca per difetto 
di attribuzione o per violazione dei limiti legali, la ragione de/la 
insindacabil ita vi en meno; Tl e approda ad al tro diver so risul ta to 
la vieta infeconda classificazione degli atti compiuti iure im-
perii o iure gestionis, la quale dovrebbe essere lasciata in dis-
parte, per maggiore utilita e chiarezza delle discussioni; 
_Attesoche ponendo a base dell 'azione che il regolamento 
edilizio comunale determinasse la facolca della amministrazione 
nella materia .che e oggetto di questa controversi.a e le restrin-
gesse entro confini varcati dal provvedimento che viet0 a1l'at-
ttice la edificazione delle fabbriche progettate, fosse stata im-
pugnata la legittimica del provvedimento medesimo, perche esor-
bitante dalla misura della podesta discrezionale competence al 
comune in questa materia; 
Attesoche, pertanto, se l'assunto fosse in fatto e in diritto ben 
fondato, ne verrebbe la possibilita che ii diritto dell'attrice fos· 
se stato leso da un atto illegittimo dell'autorita comunale ... ', 
This Italian decision shows unambiguously that the docttine of 
judicial control of a<;lministrative action is far from being exclu-
sively the creation of British Public Law, but that it appears 
instead by the turn of the century already to have distinctly ma-
tured as a doctrine within the Italian system. In effect it appears 
to have matured to an extent which prevented its being confused 
with, or hampered by, the docttine of iure imperii. The State 
seemed far, very far, from having it as good as Dicey thought it 
was; so that one may confidently affirm that if the Judges in 
Cassar Desain vs. Forbes had to be offered a choice betwee.n the 
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true Italian position in 1903, and our own quandary pre- Lowell vs. 
Caruana (and indeed after it), those judges would opt for the former 
While recognising that judicial review of administrative action 
could appropriately be invoked 'for a wide range of purposes by a 
person claiming to be aggrieved' ( vide De Smith, Constitutional 
and Administrative Law, page 546), one would still be bound to 
consider that the very subtle and abundant nuances which cannot 
be prescribed with any precision by the slow, cumbersome, un-
wieldy procedure of judicial precedent' 25 necessitate a separate 
ad hoc law of administrative liability. The absence of such a law 
was duly noted in Lowell vs. Caruana: 
' ..• wiehed ma jridx jinsa Ii, haZi:n jew tajjeb, qeghdin fil-kamp 
tal-judge-made law, peress li f'Malta la 1-Kostituzzjoni u lanqas 
ligi ohra specjali ma tirregola organikament is·suggett impottan-
tissimu ta' 1-azzjonabilita tal-lstat fil·konfront maC-cittadin'. 
I submit that it .is precisely when we come to consider the enact-
ment by Parliament of such a law that we should also actively be 
reconsidering the extent to which our legislators could usefully 
continue to follow British Public Law in this matter, and on the 
other hand the extent to which the French innovations, for exam· 
ple, . could be learnt from. It is an important exercise because 
Lowell vs. Caruana trenchantly reminds us of the great amount that 
we have taken on from British Public Law generally: thus, it was 
stated by the Court that iri the absence of special tribunals like 
the French Conseil d'Etat Maltese Law vests the power of judicial 
review in the ordinary courts which can therefore keep the Ad-
ministration in check. Further, 'il·limiti tal-poteri gudizzjatji ... . 
ghandhom ukoll jigu mfittxa fil-ligi: Ngliza in kwantu din giet adot-
tata bhala parti mil-ligi lokali .. .'. But would the fact that we 
chose not to continue to follow British Public Law but other laws 
in enacting a new law of govemmentat liability, mean that we had 
renounced the 'ordinary' jurisdiction of the 'ordinary' courts? Is it 
this consequence which is implied when 0. Hood Phillips writes: 
'The [Crown Proceedings] Act adopts the Anglo-American prin-
. ciple of treating the state . • . for the purpose of litigation as 
nearly as possible in the same way as a private citizen, instead of 
borrowing the Continental idea of a separate system of administra· 
tive law' (Constitutional and Administrative Law, page 550). 
That the said consequence is not implied by that writer in the 
phrase 'a separate system of administrative law', may be verified 
if one asks: why should we not distinguish clearly between the 
existence, jurisdictionally," ·Of separate courts as in France, and 
21 Gulia: Governmental Liability, page 21. 
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the existence of a non-private (therefore public) and 'separate' 
substantive law of administrative liability? Is not the existence of 
separate tribunals after all a jurisdictional question? While con-
sidering the lessons that the French innovations could provide 
'for English Law in the future', Griffith and Street have stated that 
to advocate the enactment by Parliament of a new code governing 
suits against the Administration, 'is not to concede that the ad-
judication of these suits need be removed from the ordinary 
courts'. 26 Therefore it should be possible to retain in our system 
the principle of adjudication by the ordinary courts and at the 
same time, with perfect compatibility, to emancipate ourselves, as 
far as the substantive law is concerned, from having only British 
Public Law to follow where Maltese Law has a lacuna. To learn 
from non-British experiments will accordingly not mean that we 
would be abdicating from the concept which we hold of a govern-
ment whose acts, if they are impugned, will be reviewed by the 
ordinary courts. To modify '1-imsemmija limiti tal-powers of judi· 
cial review in this sense would mean, not to transfer those powers 
into different hands, ·but to develop the 1 aw which those powers 
shall be implementing. 
In Lowell vs. Caruana the Court invoked the doctrine of excess 
of jurisdiction, with clearly important consequences for the issue 
of governmental liability. Yet; beyond this doctrine which is un-
avoidably useful because it is a public law doctrine, ·to what ex-
tent can it be said that British Public Law principles have directly 
and usefully contributed to developing in Malta a law of admini-
strative liability? Griffith and Street state that there is 'no sep-
arate English law of administrative liability', 27 by which they 
mean, as they make clear, that this part of English Law has to a 
very large extent subjected the Crown, although 'with serious re-
servations', 29 to private law. Thus English Law has no truly Public 
(therefore 'separate') law of administrative liability, and the same 
writers state that 'English judges are plainly desirous of evolving 
fair principles of administrative liability, but are circumscribed by 
their adherence to private law concepts'. 29 One may submit, having 
regard to all this, that it is not logically possible to attempt to 
distinguish, as the Court of Appeal did in Cassar Desain vs. 
Forbes, between the 'general' and the 'constitutional' or public 
law of England: there was, and is, ·but one English law of ad-
26 Griffith and Street: Administrative Law, page 248. 
27 lbid. 
29 Ibid. page 247. 
29 Ibid. page 248. 
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mi01suative liability, and that law is not set apart, saving impor-
tant reservations (as for example in contract the Crown's 'poten-
tially unrestricted competence to enter into contracts', 30 and the 
Crown's legal position as employer), from the private law. Cer-
tainly that decision of our Courts remains outstanding for its re-
statement of the English Public Law principle that the Administra-
tion must act within the law. But what happens when the Admin-
istration is called to account not for the breach of a rule of public 
law but for a breach of obligations in the private law domain? In 
this particular regard British Public Law could not directly be of 
use co us beyond the point of handing down to us the said prin-
ciple of Responsible Administration; there were no public law 
principles governing administrative contract or tortious liability 
which we could take on. All that .the Court of Appeal could revert 
to were our written codes: 
'Indeed - and this is the one fact and rule governing the whole 
question under judgement - our written codes do not discrimin-
ate between the Crown (as the Government is expressly tenned 
. in various provisions) and its subjects in regard to the operation 
and the administration of the law; and ubi lex non distinguit nee 
nos distinguere debemus •.. '. 31 
It would appear from this that we too in Malta, who of course had 
no 'public' law rules in this particular area to start with, have 
followed the English example and have therefore subjected the 
State to the private law. It should be said straightaway that this 
argument, that once our civil laws do not distinguish between the 
State and private citizens therefore the State is equally liable in 
civil damages, has been adopted expressly in just one other deci-
sion, in Xuereb vs. Micallef (3/10/53) by Alberto Magri J., though 
I submit the argument has further been adopted impliedly in Ca-
milleri vs. Gatt decided per Giovanni Pullicino J. (XVIII.11.171) 
and in Apap Bologna vs. Borg Olivier noe decided per Alberto 
Magri J. (XL.II.903). Xuereb vs. Micallef directly reminds us of 
the 'one fact and rule governing the whole question' in Cassar 
Oesain vs. Forbes (ibid.): 
'Illi skond 1-art. 107 3 (Kod. Civ.), kull min jaghmel uzu ta' jedd 
tieghu fil-qies Ii jmissu ma jweglbx ghall-hsara li tigti b'dana 
1-um, u kull wie,ned iwiegeb gnall-hsara Ii tigi:i bi htija tiegl'll, 
(art. 107 4 Kod. Civ.). 11-lokuzzjoni tal-ligi hija generika, u ma 
· taghmel ebda eccezzjoni, lanqas ghall-Gvem. Ghalhekk anki 1-
»s.A. de Smith: Constitutional and Administrative Law, page 589. 
11 XXIX.I.43. 
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Gvern obbligat jaghmel tajj eb ghad-danni fil-kaz Ii huwa, fl-
ezercizzju tad-drittijiet tiegbu, johro g barra mill-gusti limiti u 
jikkag\Ula pregudizzju Ii t·terzi ... ' 
By way of a weighty rebuttal against any suggestion that the 
State had acted iure imperii, the Court stated: ' ... il-konvenuti ma 
jistgbux a priori, u b'mod pregudizzjali, jippretendu li 1-Gvem 
mhuwiex responsabbli tal-hsara reklamata mill-attur'. Magri J., 
pointing out that ' ... del resto, ir-rispett gbad-dritt tal-proprieta 
jimponi ruhl anki lill-Gvem (arg. art. 357 Kod. Civ.) .. .'(cf. now 
the Constitution), was prepared to hold that even where the State 
had acted in the public interest, it would still be liable if it there-
by caused damage to private property. 
In Camilleri vs. Gatt, Pullicino J. appears to have adopted the 
argument not expressly, but as an 'inarticulate major premise'. 
How else could it be explained that he unhesitatingly invoked the 
purely private law notion of quasi-conuact (s.1055 Civil Code) not 
merely in regard to the government, but in relation to a govern-
mental act which 'falls within the traditional characteristics of 
iure imperii'? 32 Exactly the same may be asked about Apap Bol-
ogna vs. Borg Olivier noe (XL.11.903) in which Magri J. thorough-
goingly applied, in the process of determining adminisuative lia-
bility, the Civil Code provisions relating to conttibutory negli-
gence (s. 1094 Civil Code), culpa (s.1075), the obligation to give a 
thing ( s. 1169), and force majeure (s. 1176); and this without a re-
ference to the docuine of iure imperii throughout the judgement. 
The judgements in Camilleri vs. Gatt (XVIII.11.171), Xuereb vs . . 
Micallef (XXXVII.11. 753), and Apap Bologna vs. Borg Olivier noe 
(XL.II.903) clearly represent a consistent facet of our 'judge-made' 
law of governmental liability. But I would disagree with Dr.Gulia's 
suggestion that Judges Magri and Pullicino were 'administering 
justice, possibly in spite of the l~w .. .'; 33 their intention to ad-
minister justice was certainly redoubtable, but they were doing 
this, I propose, not in spite of the law, but in virtue of the law and 
because it appeared to these judges that their approach was doubt-
less the correct legal approach. The said judgements fall in line, 
expressly or impliedly, ·with the proposition, in Cassar Desain vs. 
Forbes (XXIX.I.43), that 'our written codes do not discriminate 
between the Crown ... and its subjects in regard to the operation 
32 Gulia: Governmental Liability, page 9. A telling point in Camilleri vs. 
Gatt is the following: 'Atteso che il principio suddettO e sostenuto quasi 
unanimamente dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza di Francia e di Italia 
.•• '. Pullicino J. was a very enlightened judge. 
33 Gulia: Governmental L i abiliry, page 20. 
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and the administration of the law; and ubi lex non distinguit nee 
nos distinguere debemus ..• '; although of course Cassar Desain 
vs. Forbes has had wider implications than any of the said judge-
ments, not merely in attempting to attack directly the doctrine of 
iure imperii but in underscoring the accountability of government in 
the public law sense, so that, as I proposed earlier on, Lowell vs. 
Caruana carries on where Cassar Desain vs. Forbes left off. 
Indeed although the relevance to Lowell vs. Caruana of referring 
to the judgements above may not be apparent, in so far as the 
latter have applied the civil law as the basis for decision, yet I 
would justify their relevance by proposing that they too, like 
Lowell vs. Caruana, insist upon the same inexorable point in the 
field of governmental liability: whatever the extent of the doctrine 
of iure imperii, the first point necessarily to be investigated be-
fore all else should be whether there has been a 'contravention of 
the law', 34 be it a contravention of a rule of public law or of private 
law, whether the Administration has exceeded or abused its powers 
as laid down in an act of Parliament or whether it has made itself 
liable in terms of the civil law, in the same way that any ordinary 
citizen would make himself liable. All this certainly attests a co-
gental judicial effort to establish convincing legal criteria for the 
purpose of determining governmental liability, in spite of and 
whatever the part played by the doctrine of iure imperii. 
34 Cassar Desain vs. Forbes. 
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